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STOP RESTRICTING SPEECH AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC:
A REVIEW OF THE ABA'S PROPOSED CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY
CANON OF THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Tiffany L. Carwile*

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a candidate in an election for county judge. As part of his campaign,
the candidate decides to attend local events to which he has been invited. The candidate attends both Republican and Democratic events in the neighborhood. In addition, his daughter makes appearances and speeches on his behalf at other local events
sponsored by both political parties. For some reason, the sponsors do not invite his
opponent, but the candidate still attends to further his campaign because he would like
to win the election. The candidate wins the election, but ethical charges are filed
against him. Apparently, attending campaign events while running for election is a violation of the state's Code of Judicial Conduct if the events are political. As a consequence, the judge receives a public reprimand for taking steps that would aid him in
his campaign.
The previous scenario occurred in Florida during the 2002 election, and the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the Judicial Qualifications Commission's recommendation for
a public reprimand.' The judge was sanctioned for doing what the election requiredexplaining to the public why it should vote him into office. That information usually
includes the candidate's position on current issues and promises for the future. Without this information, the public is left to choose candidates based on nothing but
"personal appearances.", 2 However, a problem seems to arise when the sought-after
office is that of ajudge. Although all federal judges are appointed, judicial elections
are a popular way of selecting state judges, with thirty states choosing this method
over an appointment or merit selection system. Differing from other officials, judges
"are expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies" and are expected
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2007; B.A., Political Science and International
Studies, Baldwin-Wallace College, 2004.
' See In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2004).
2 J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953,956 (Ky. 1991), cert.denied,502 U.S. 816 (1991).
3 ROBERTA. CARPETAL., JuDICIALPRocEss INAMERICA 101(6th ed. 2004). Partisan elections are held in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia; nonpartisan elections are held in Arizona, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Id.
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to be "independent" and "impartial.",4 A judicial candidate who gives his position on
current issues may threaten "this appearance of impartiality."5
Trying to tend to the problem between informing voters and maintaining impartiality, the American Bar Association (ABA) created a code to restrict campaign speech
and behavior.6 The 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics lasted almost fifty years, but in
1972, the ABA made changes to the rules and adopted the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. 7 The ABA subsequently revised the Code in 1990. Since 1972, almost every
state has adopted a variation of the Code.8 The state codes include sanctions for candidates who violate the provisions. Some of the various violations of which candidates
have been accused seem trivial, but others are quite serious. 9
The current codes, in the states and the Model Code, usually have five or seven
canons. In the Model Code, Canon 5 pertains to judicial campaign activities, with the
first clause being the "political activity" clause, which regulates candidate conduct
in and for political organizations.' ° The subsequent clauses are similar and regulate
a candidate's speech. They are the "pledges or promises" clause and the "commit"
clause, and they apply to statements the candidate is not allowed to make while campaigning." The 1972 Code contained an "announce" clause, which also applied to
4 Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White 1), 536 U.S. 765,803-04(2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).

' Julie Schvering Schuetz, Comment, JudicialCampaign Speech Restrictions in Light

of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 295, 296 (2004).
6 Cristopher Rapp, Note, The Will of the People,the Independence of the Judiciary,and
Free Speech in JudicialElections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 21 J.L. &
POL. 103, 105 (2005).
7 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(1972), reprinted in

LISA L. MILORD, THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 109 (1992).
8 Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1066 (1996).

9 In Florida, the Judicial Qualifications Commission sanctioned a judge for:
attend[ing] a "Grass Roots BBQ" sponsored by the Marion County
Republican Party to which [his] opponent was not invited, with [his]
wife and daughter where [he] and they campaigned for [his] election[,] ... campaign[ing] for [his] election at a "Salute to Labor Picnic
and Democratic Candidate Rally[,]" ... [and] knowingly permitt[ing]
one of [his] daughters to attend, speak and campaign at a meeting of
the Palm Bay Democratic in Marion County, Florida to which [his]
opponent was not invited.
In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 2004). A case arose in Georgia dealing with more
serious allegations; the candidate produced a brochure claiming that his opponent "would
require the State to license same-sex marriages, ... referred to traditional moral standards
as 'pathetic and disgraceful,' ... [and] called the electric chair 'silly."' Weaver v. Bonner,
114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2000), affd inpartandrev'd inpart,309 F.3d 1312
(11 th Cir. 2002).
'0 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

"

Id. Canon 5A(3)(d).

Canon 5A(1) (1990).
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campaign speech.' 2 This clause, however, was later found to be unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court and has since been removed from the modem version of the
Code.' 3 Today's codes also contain a "misrepresent" clause. This clause prohibits
candidates from misrepresenting information regarding either themselves or their
opponents.14 The last significant provision is the "solicitation" clause, which con15
trols a candidate's fundraising and solicitation.
Although the Code was meant to "alleviate the tensions between the judge's role
and the reality of political campaigns," some courts have started to view the restrictions "with increasing skepticism."' 6 The most influential decision was the Supreme
Court's ruling in Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White ("White 1"), which declared

that Minnesota's announce clause violated the First Amendment.' 7 Since the White I
decision in 2002, many lower courts have heard challenges to judicial campaign restrictions and have provided mixed rulings. 8 In response, the ABA is revising its Model
Code of Judicial Conduct and has held hearings on the proposed revisions. 9 The revisions pertinent to this Note regard the campaign activity canons, which the proposed
Code would move from Canon 5 to Canon 4.20

This Note analyzes the new Canon 4 of the proposed Code in light of White I and
its progeny. The ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (the "Commission") has proposed many changes to the Code-some of
which are quite substantial-in hopes that it will meet First Amendment standards.2'
However, the latest draft does not appear to take into account the concerns of recent
court decisions-most significantly, the Eighth Circuit's decision in "White IT' that
Minnesota's partisan-activities and solicitation clauses are unconstitutional. 22 Unfortunately, the draft does not effectively address the First Amendment concerns and does
not follow the clear trend of the federal courts. In light of recent court decisions, the
ABA should change its approach from restricting speech to educating the public regarding the importance of an impartial and independent judiciary.
12 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972), reprintedin MILORD,

supra note 7, at 128.
'" White I, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
14 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
15 Id. Canon 5C(2).
16

5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990).

Rapp, supra note 6, at 105.

17536

U.S. 765.

'8

See infra Part IV.

'9

ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, http://www

.abanet.org/judicialethics (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
20 Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, in ABA JOINT
EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT TO THE
DELEGATES

22

HOUSE OF

149-80 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/house-report.pdf [herein-

after ABA REPORT].
21

COMM'N TO

ABA

Compare id., with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990).
Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White 11), 416 F.3d 738,745 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
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Part I of this Note introduces the history of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
describing the background for its adoption and reasons for changes. Part I discusses
the Supreme Court's decision in White I and gives a detailed description of the scope
of the restrictions. Part II then looks at the White II decision on remand to the Eighth
Circuit and its conclusions regarding the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses.
Part IV reviews other decisions involving state codes of judicial conduct. Some of
these decisions uphold the restrictions while others say they are unconstitutional. Part
V analyzes the proposed code in light of the recent decisions and discusses the problems in some of the provisions. The last section, Part VI, gives recommendations
regarding the provisions and other measures that can help preserve the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary. The section reviews state provisions that differ
from the Model Code in an effort to find the best approach to the problem.
I. HISTORY OF THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

The ABA completed the Canons of Professional Ethics for Lawyers in 1908. A
few years later, in 1921, the ABA confronted a problem regarding the activities of a
federal judge who refused to step down from the bench while serving as Commissioner
of Major League Baseball. 23 After this incident, the ABA drafted and accepted the
Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924.24 The Canons were merely guidelines and not strict
rules, 25 but many states passed legislation to make the Canons law with sanctions for
violations.26 Canon 30 related directly to candidates and included a promises clause
and an announce clause.27 Canon 28 prohibited judges from engaging in political party
activities, but the ABA later amended it to allow some activities when the judge was
a candidate in an election. 8
23

Rapp, supra note 6, at 111.

24

id.

25

Shepard, supra note 8, at 1065 n.26.

26

Schuetz, supra note 5, at 300.

27 Id. at 301. Canon 30 provided that a candidate "should not make ... promises of
conduct... [and] should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues
to secure class support." Id.
28 MILORD, supra note 7, at 45. Canon 28 provided that a judge "should
avoid making
political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or contributions to party funds,
the public endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in party con-

ventions." ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924), reprintedin MILORD, supra

note 7, at 140. The 1950 amendment added the following sentence:
Where, however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated and elected
as candidates of a political party, nothing herein contained shall prevent the judge from attending or speaking at political gatherings, or from
making contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has nomi-

nated him and seeks his election or re-election.
Id., reprintedin MLORD, supra note 7, at 139-40 & n.2.
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By the late 1960s, the "Canons seemed increasingly anachronistic.

''

29

Some con-

troversies resulting from the activities of Justices Fortas and Douglas while on the
Supreme Court alerted the ABA to the need for a new code. 30 The result was the
1972 Code of Judicial Conduct. Unlike the 1924 Canons, the states were to use the
revised Code as a model to adopt new regulations in their jurisdictions.3 The Code
contained seven Canons, with the subject of Canon 7 being political and campaign
conduct.32 Section A provided "general standards of political conduct for all judges
and all candidates," whereas section B "set[] the campaign standards."3 3 The drafters
wanted to make clear the difference between "general political conduct and campaign
conduct."34 Section B contained the pledges-or-promises, announce, misrepresent,
and solicitation clauses.3
Believing that the Code needed stronger standards, the ABA issued the 1990 Code
of Judicial Conduct.3 6 The revised Code contained significant changes from the 1972
37
version, the most significant of which was "tightening up the hortatory language.
The 1990 version used "shall" instead of "should" in its regulations of judicial conduct. 38 The ABA believed that "judicial discipline needed to be tougher in an era
when legal institutions were generally under wider attack on ethical issues."'3 9
29
30

Shepard, supra note 8, at 1065.
Schuetz, supra note 5, at 302. Justice Abe Fortas served three years on the Supreme

Court as an associate justice; when President Lyndon B. Johnson nominated him for Chief
Justice, the Senate refused to confirm him over "charges of ethical impropriety." DAVID W.
NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS, AND POLITICS IN
THE UNITED STATES 507

(3d ed. 2004). The Senate then threatened impeachment over Fortas's
"financial dealings with a convicted felon," causing Fortas to resign from the Court. Id.
31 Schuetz, supra note 5, at 302. Only Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin
failed to
adopt the new code. Shepard, supranote 8, at 1066 n.34 (citing JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS CURRICULUM, Directions to Instructors 3 (1993)).
32 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), reprintedin MILORD, supra note 7, at
127-29.
33 E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 95 (1973).
34 id.
35 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c),

(2) (1972), reprinted in

MILORD, supra note 7, at 128. The relevant provisions provide that a judge:
(1)(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office...;
announce his views ... ; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications,
present position, or other fact.
(2). . . should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit
publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible
persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign
and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy.

Id., reprintedin MILORD, supra note 7, at 128.
36 Rapp, supra note 6, at 113.

" Shepard, supra note 8, at 1066.
38 Id.
31 Id. (citations omitted).
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The campaign speech regulations of the 1990 Code are contained in Canon 5. One
major change was the announce clause, which the ABA did not incorporate into the
new version. 40 In addition, the ABA added a "knowing requirement for the misrepresent provision."'" A preamble accompanies the 1990 version, which states that the
system is based on "an independent, fair and competent judiciary" and that judges must
"strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system., 42 The ABA amended
the Code in 1999 to add regulations regarding "contribution limits and disclosure standards" and a provision requiring "judges to disqualify themselves from hearing cases
43
in which parties or their lawyers contributed more than the allowed amounts.
II. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE ("WHITE I")-BEFORE THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT

Throughout its history, Minnesota has selected all judges through popular election,
with the election becoming nonpartisan in 1912. 44 In 1974, Minnesota adopted an
"announce clause," which stated that a "'candidate for a judicial office, including an
incumbent judge,' shall not 'announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues." 45 If a candidate violated the clause, he was subject to disciplinary action. For
incumbent judges, the penalties included "removal, censure, civil penalties, and suspension without pay; '46 for lawyers, the penalties included "disbarment, suspension,
and probation. 47
A. Case Facts and Background

Gregory Wersal ran for the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1996.48 As part of his
campaign, Wersal criticized the court for its decisions regarding "crime, welfare, and
40

Schuetz, supra note 5, at 304. Instead, the clause reads:

(3) A candidate for a judicial office:
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before
the court ....
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) (1990).
41 Schuetz, supra note 5, at 304. The clause states that candidates "shall

not... knowingly
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate
or an opponent." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
41 Schuetz, supra note 5, at 305.
44 White I, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
41 Id. (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(I) (2000)).
42

46

41
48

Id. (citing MINN. R. BD. ON JUD. STANDARDS 1 l(d) (2002)).
Id. (citing MINN. R. LAW. PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 15(a) (2002)).
Id.
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abortion." 49 During the course of the campaign, an individual filed a complaint against
Wersal with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, alleging a violation of
Minnesota's "announce" clause; the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board (the "Board") dismissed the complaint, however,"express[ing] doubt whether
the clause could constitutionally be enforced." 50 Even though the Board took no
action, Wersal withdrew from the election "fearing that further ethical complaints
would jeopardize his ability to practice law."5'
He decided to run again in 1998 and asked the Board to state whether it would enforce the announce clause. 2 Because Wersal had not submitted a list of the announcements he wanted to make, the Board declined to answer his question. 3 He then filed
suit in federal court seeking "a declaration that the announce clause violate[d] the First
Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement."' Upholding the announce
clause, the district court found no First Amendment violation. 5 On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 6 The Republican Party appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted a writ of certiorari and agreed to hear the
case on March 26, 2002. 57
B. The Court's Opinion

Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia delivered the
58
opinion for the Court, with concurring opinions by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer dissented.59 The Court focused, first,
49

50

id.
Id. at 768-69.

51Id. at 769.
52 Id.
53 Id.

Id. at 769-70.
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967 (D. Minn. 1999).
56 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
57 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001).
54

Justice O'Connor believed that judicial elections undermined the interest of impartiality and the state "voluntarily" risked a partial judiciary by having elections. White I, 536
U.S. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy said the state does not have the
power to enact "direct restrictions" on campaign speech because this speech "is at the heart
of the First Amendment"; he would not have inquired into "narrow tailoring or compelling
government interests." Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He then suggested that the states
have strict recusal policies to handle the problem of impartiality. Id. at 794.
59 According to Justice Stevens, the Court did not give enough weight to the state's interest of impartiality and assumed judicial candidates had the same rights of expression as other
58

elected officials. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that judicial elec-

tions were different from other elections and should not receive the same First Amendment
protections. Id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

1060

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

(Vol. 15:1053

on the meaning of the announce clause. It stated that the clause "covers much more
than promising to decide an issue a particular way. The prohibition extends to the
candidate's mere statement of his current position, even if he does not bind himself
to maintain that position after election."'' The Court noted some limitations to the
clause, but then said that these "are not all that they appear to be.' A candidate may
criticize past court decisions, but he must also declare his adherence to stare decisis.62
Furthermore, although the scope of the clause is limited only to issues the candidate
will likely hear, the Court found that this was "not much of a limitation at all., 63 It
stated that "there is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before
a judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction."'
Justice Scalia agreed with the Eighth Circuit that "the announce clause both prohibits speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech that is 'at the
core of our First Amendment freedoms'-speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. 65 Because of these prohibitions, strict scrutiny was the correct
standard in determining the constitutionality of the clause. Under strict scrutiny, the
clause had to be "narrowly tailored, to serve. .. a compelling state interest. ,66
The Eighth Circuit found two interests to be "sufficiently compelling to justify
the announce clause: preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving
the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary.'67 Respondents argued that
the first interest was compelling because "it protect[ed] the due process rights of litipreserve[d] public confidence in the judiciary. 6 8
gants," and the second because "it
In determining whether these were actually compelling interests, Justice Scalia looked
at the different meanings of "impartiality."
The first meaning he analyzed was "the lack of bias for or against either party to
the proceeding," 69 which was the one the respondents cited in their briefs.7 ° However,
60
61
62
63

Id. at 770.
Id. at 772.
Id.
id.

6 Id. at 772-73 (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,229 (7th Cir.
1993)).
61 Id. at 774 (citation omitted).
66

Id. at 774-75. But see Mark D. Rosen, InstitutionalContext in ConstitutionalLaw: A

CriticalExamination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography

Ordinances,21 J.L. & POL. 223, 231-32 (2005) (noting that the law on which the Court relied
to support the use of strict scrutiny dealt with legislative or executive elections and that it may
be "plausible to draw a constitutional distinction between the context ofjudicial elections...
and legislative and executive elections").
67 White 1,536 U.S. at 775 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 867
(8th Cir. 2001)).
68
69

70

Id.
Id.
Id. at 775-76.
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he thought "it plain that the announce clause [was] not narrowly tailored to serve
impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) in this sense."'" This analysis rested on
the fact that the clause restricts speech regarding issues, not parties. Justice Scalia reasoned that any party holding a different belief than the one stated by the judge is just
72
as likely to lose; thus, "[t]he judge is applying the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly."
The second meaning given by Justice Scalia for "impartiality" was a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legalview."73 This concept is not a "compelling" interest and would not be even a favorable interest.74 "'Proof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasain the area of consti75
tutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."
He noted that Minnesota mandates that state judges "'shall be learned in the law,"'
so the judges would have views regarding the law.76 If "avoiding judicial preconceptions" is not desirable, then this "type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling
77
state interest.
The third possible meaning was open-mindedness, which requires ajudge to "be
willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion. 7' According to the respondents, the announce clause "relieves a judge from
pressure to rule a certain way in order to maintain consistency with statements the
judge has previously made. 79 Justice Scalia did not believe this meaning was
71

Id. at 776. In an article, Erwin Chemerinsky explained this point further:
All judges come on to the bench with views about important issues,
whether or not these have been expressed during the election campaign
or the confirmation process. The key question is whether ajudge is more
likely to follow these views if they have been expressed. If the judge
would do the same thing whether or not the views have been expressed,
then the speech does not make the judge less impartial. The judge has
exactly the same biases; the only difference is whether people know
them in advance. Antonin Scalia would vote to overrule Roe v. Wade
whether he expressed this in his confirmation hearings or not.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictionson the Speech ofJudicialCandidatesAre Unconstitutional,

35 IND. L. REv. 735, 744 (2002) (citation omitted).
72 White 1, 536 U.S. at 777.
73 id.
74 Id.

71 Id. at

778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)); see also NEUBAUER &
supra note 30, at 196 ("[T]he Court's decision strikes 'a blow against calculated
ignorance that should well serve both those who seek court seats and those who decide to fill
them' by ending the 'intellectual fiction... that middle-aged adults have not formed opinions
about the law."' (quoting Editorial, Truth in JudicialPackaging,PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), June 30, 2002, at H2)).
76 White I, 536 U.S. at 778 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. VI, §
5).
MEINHOLD,

77
78

id.
Id.

'9 Id. at 778-79.
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compelling enough to overcome strict scrutiny. He noted that Minnesota encouraged its judges to give speeches or write books, and in so doing, the judges would
"announce" their views on legal issues.8 °
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the announce clause was "woefully underinclusive" as it prohibited speech during an election but not before or after the election.81
Justice Scalia recognized the tension between electing judges and the announce clause,
which "places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits., 8 2 He said that this
tension was not surprising because the ABA opposes judicial elections and prefers
merit selection; however, "the First Amendment does not permit it to achieve its goal
by leaving the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing what the elections are about. 83 The Court ruled that the announce clause
violated the First Amendment.'
I1. REPUBLICAN PARTY

OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE ("WHITE ll")-ON REMAND TO

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit to consider the remaining issues for which the Court had not granted certiorari. The two issues were the
partisan-activities clause and the solicitation clause.8 ' The partisan-activities clause
stated: "Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge or a candidate for election to
judicial office shall not: (a) identify themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to vote in an election;... (d) attend political gatherings;
or seek, accept or use endorsements from a political organization., 86 The solicitation
clause prohibited candidates from "personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing] campaign
contributions. 87 Candidates could "establish committees to conduct campaigns...
[and] [s]uch committees may solicit and accept campaign contributions"; however,
a committee was not allowed to disclose the identity of donors to the candidate.88
On remand, the panel for the Eighth Circuit upheld the solicitation clause and remanded the partisan-activities clause to the district court for reconsideration. 89 The
panel's decision was appealed, and the Eighth Circuit granted the request for en banc

80 id.

Id. at 780.
Id. at 787.
83 Id. at 787-88.
84 Id. at 788.
81 White II, 416 F.3d 738, 744- 45 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
86 Id. at 745 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(a), (d) (2004)).
81
82

87 Id.
88 Id.

89

Id. at 744.
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review. Upon review, the court held that both clauses violated the First Amendment.9"
In deciding whether the clauses were invalid, the court determined that the clauses
infringed on a candidate's free speech and were subject to strict scrutiny. 9' After
reviewing the three possible meanings of "impartiality" that the Supreme Court discussed, the Eighth Circuit applied these meanings to the partisan-activities and solicitation clauses.
Regarding the partisan-activities clause and the interest in having unbiased judges,
the court believed the Supreme Court's analysis of the announce clause was applicable.92 "Minnesota argue[d]
that
a party label is nothing more than shorthand for the
•
,,93
views ajudicial candidate holds. Whether by announcing or aligning through political parties, a judge will favor one position over another regardless of the parties involved; he would not be biased against any particular party, just the position the party
takes in the case.' Under the open-mindedness meaning of impartiality, the clause was
"woefully underinclusive.,, 95 Like the announce clause, the partisan-activities clause
only bars activities during the campaign; therefore, a candidate could have a long history with a political party prior to and after a campaign. 96 The court concluded that
the clause could not withstand strict scrutiny and thus was unconstitutional.97
After deciding the partisan-activities clause issue, the court turned to the solicitation clause. It found that "Minnesota assert[ed] that keeping judicial candidates from
personally soliciting campaign funds serve[d] its interest.., by preventing any undue
influence flowing from financial support."9 8 With regard to the interest of an unbiased
judge, the court found the clause to be "barely tailored."' If all contributions were
donated through the candidate's committee, as the Canon mandates, a candidate would
not know who donated and could not be biased for or against a party at trial. 10 The
court then asked whether the clause serves the interest of open-mindedness. Asking
for contributions would not damage the judge's willingness to "remain open to persuasion," and therefore, the clause could not pass the strict scrutiny standard.'0 ' Because the clause did not survive strict scrutiny, the court concluded that it violated the
First Amendment.' 02
9 Id.
9' Id. at 749.
92 Id. at 754.
93 id.
94

id.

9' Id. at
96 Id.
97 Id. at
98 Id. at
99 Id. at
1oo Id.
'01 Id. at
102 Id.

758.

766.
764.
765.
766.
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF WHITE I

A. Decisions Holding Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions Unconstitutional
1. Weaver v. Bonner
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in White I, the Eleventh Circuit decided a case involving the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. In Weaver v. Bonner,
the codes in question stated that candidates:
shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which the candidate knows or reasonably should know
is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary
to make the communication considered as a whole not materially
misleading or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation
03
about results the candidate can achieve.1
It also stated that candidates "'shall not themselves solicit campaign funds, or solicit
' ' 1 °4
publicly stated support.
George Weaver ran for the Georgia Supreme Court in 1998, and as part of his campaign he distributed a brochure stating his opponent's views on "same-sex marriage,
traditional moral standards, and the electric chair."' 0 5 Two complaints were filed, and
the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) determined that the statements were
"false, misleading, and deceptive."' 6 The JQC issued a cease and desist order, causing
Weaver to revise the brochure.'0 7 Subsequently, Weaver produced a television advertisement that included the same issues as the first brochure.' 08 Upon receiving three
complaints, the JQC concluded that the advertisement violated the cease and desist
order and issued a public statement that Weaver "engaged in 'unethical, unfair, false
and intentionally deceptive' campaign practices."'"
Following the public statement, Weaver filed suit against the JQC alleging that
Canons 7(B)(1)(d) and 7(B)(2) were unconstitutional. "o° The district court upheld
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2002) (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
"4 Id. (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)).
103

105
106
107

Id. at 1316.
Id.
id.

'o' Id. at 1317.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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Canon 7(B)(2) but ruled Canon 7(B)(1)(d) violated the First Amendment."' On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest."' Although false statements do not receive the same level
of First Amendment protection, "'breathing space"' must be allowed for "false statements negligently made and true statements that are misleading or deceptive."'' " The
court concluded that "to be narrowly tailored, restrictions on candidate speech...
must be limited to false statements that are made with knowledge of falsity or with
' 4
reckless disregard." "
Disagreeing with the district court, the Eleventh Circuit also held that Canon
7(B)(2) failed strict scrutiny and thus was unconstitutional." 5 The court noted that
candidates were "completely chilled" from speaking to voters about donations, which
are necessary to run an effective campaign." 6 A candidate could not personally solicit
funds, but a committee was allowed to solicit."7 However, this arrangement did not
significantly reduce the risk "that judges will be tempted to rule a particular way." ' 8
If judges would be biased towards people who contributed, then impartiality would
result "regardless of who did the soliciting."" 9 Therefore, the court held that the clause
violated the First Amendment." 0
2. Family Trust Foundationof Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek
During the 2004 judicial elections in Kentucky, the Family Foundation distributed questionnaires to the judicial candidates entitled "2004 Kentucky Candidate
Information Survey."'' Most candidates declined to answer citing the Kentucky Code
of Judicial Conduct as disallowing them to respond to the questions. 2 The relevant
section of the code stated:
(1) A judge or candidate for election to judicial office:
(c) shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
Id. at 1318.
12 Id. at 1319.
113 Id. (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982)).
"'

114

Id.

"

Id. at 1322.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

"

Id. at 1323.

120

id.

Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (E.D. Ky. 2004),
stay denied sub nom. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388
F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004).
122 Id. at 680-82.
121
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office; shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
likely to come before the court; and shall not misrepresent any can23
didate's identity, qualifications, present position, or other facts.1
The commentary stated that this section "prohibits campaigning on issues in a manner
24
designed solely to appeal to public social bias in order to gain a political advantage."'
In determining whether Canon 5B(1)(c) violated the First Amendment, the court
reviewed three previous cases dealing with the Kentucky code. Prior to 1991,
Kentucky had an announce clause similar to the one struck down in White I, which
the Kentucky Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R. 25
According to the court, the clause left voters to choose candidates solely on "personal
appearances."'' 26 After this decision, the state dropped the announce clause and added
127
the commit clause to the code.
The second case involved a candidate's advertisements that read: "Jed Deters is
a Pro-Life Candidate."128 The Judicial Retirement & Removal Commission received
a complaint and upon reviewing the materials, concluded that the statement equated
29
to committing or appearing to commit on an issue in violation of Canon 5B(1)(c).1
Deters appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, but the court determined that the
statements undermined the impartiality of the courts. 30
The third case involved a letter that read, "it is time to judge our judges," "stop
the abuse instead of treating it," and "[p]lease join me in stopping the abuse and vote
for a person who will let no one walk away before justice is served."'31 The letter referenced the opponent's decision to sentence a child abuser to five years in jail and then
later suspend the sentence. 132 The court thought these statements, viewed "in the context of the.., judicial campaign," represented a "commitment to prevent the probation
of child abusers."'133 The court cited Deters to dismiss the First Amendment claim,
and it said that J. C.J.D. involved the announce clause, which was no longer a part
of the judicial canon.'"
123

Id. at 676 (citing KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(1)(c)). A clause such as

the second in this subsection is commonly referred to as a "commit" clause.
124

Id.

125

803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991).

126

id.

Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Ky. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
129 Id. at 201-02.
130 Id. at 205.
131 Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Ky. 1997).
127

128

132
133
134

Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
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In determining whether Kentucky's promise and commit clauses violated the
First Amendment in Wolnitzek, the district court used the Supreme Court's decision
in White Ias a guideline.'35 The court concluded that preventing candidates from promising to decide a particular way was a compelling state interest. 36 However, the court
noted that the clauses were not limited to promises and commitments and "thus apply
to a broad swath of promises that are not protected by any compelling government
interest."' 37 According to the court, the clauses were actually a "general prohibition
against promises," which were "merely announcements of legal views," and there38
fore protected.
Furthermore, the court looked at how the state had applied the promise and commit clauses. Reviewing Deters and Summe, the court determined that the state had
applied the clauses to more than promises or commitments. 139 It concluded that the
clauses "encompass[ed] vast categories of speech that the Supreme Court concluded
were protected in White."'" The state had used the clauses "as a defacto announce
4
clause," and therefore, the clauses did not meet the standards set forth in White L '
B. Decisions UpholdingJudicial Campaign Speech Restrictions
1. In re Raab-Court of Appeals of New York
The Commission on Judicial Conduct in New York charged Raab with violating
the political activity restrictions of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. 42 Raab
argued that White I should govern the case, and "that the distinction drawn in the rules
between the political activities... [for] their own campaigns... and the activities...
on behalf of political parties or other candidates is constitutionally flawed."' 143 The
court disagreed that White would require a conclusion that the clause was "constitutionally flawed."' 44
"' Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672,694 (E.D. Ky. 2004),
stay denied sub nom. Family Trust Found of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388
F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004).
136

id. at 695.

137Id.
138

Id. at 697.

139

id.

Id. at 698.
141 Id. at 699. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's ruling
that the clauses were "a defacto announce clause" and that they violated White L Family Trust
Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004).
142 In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (N.Y. 2003). The prohibitions included involvement
in partisan politics, campaigning for another political candidate, allowing his name to be associated with a political organization, attending political functions, and soliciting funds for a
political organization. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 22, §§ 100.5(A)(1)(c)-(h) (1996).
143 Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1290.
140

144

id.
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The court used strict scrutiny and determined that the clause was "narrowly tailored to further a number of compelling state interests, including... impartiality and
independence of [the] state judiciary."' 45 The court noted that "[t]he State's interest
is not limited solely to preventing actual corruption through contributor-candidate
arrangements. Of equal import is the prevention of the appearance of corruption,"
which is a compelling state interest.146 Furthermore, the rules were narrowly tailored
because they "distinguish between conduct integral to a judicial candidate's own campaign and activity in support of other candidates or party objectives."' 47 The court
upheld both the clauses and the Commission's sanction against Raab.'48
2. In re Watson--Court of Appeals of New York
This case involved New York's pledges and promises clause.' 49 Watson presented
himself as pro-law enforcement through letters to the police and the newspapers. 5 °
The Commission on Judicial Conduct found that Watson's statements "'created the
appearance that he would not be impartial ... and would be biased against criminal
defendants.'"" 5 ' On appeal, the court held that Watson had promised to "aid law enforcement," which is "significantly different" from announcing one's views.'5 2 It cited
impartiality and appearance of impartiality as compelling state interests, which the rule
promoted by "preventing party bias."' 53 The court concluded that the clause was narrowly tailored and therefore constitutional.' 54
V. WHAT Do THESE CASES MEAN FOR THE PROPOSED CODE?

Because judicial campaign speech is "'at the core of our First Amendment freedoms,"' the Supreme Court determined that courts should analyze restrictions of this
speech under the strict scrutiny standard of the First Amendment.' 55 Only one of the
restrictions in Canon 4 of the proposed Model Code of Judicial Conduct falls into an
exception to the Amendment. The recognized exceptions are speech that is obscene,
is defamatory, is criminal, is likely to cause imminent harm, incites lawlessness, or
145 Id.

Id. at 1291 (quoting Nicholson v. State Comm'n of Judicial Conduct, 409 N.E.2d 818,
822 (N.Y. 1980)).
141 Id. at 1292.
148 Id. at 1293.
141In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2003).
150
Id.
1I'
Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
146

152 Id. at 5, 6.
'53 Id. at

6.

'14Id. at 7.
151

White 1, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (citation omitted).
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impairs another's constitutional right. I"6 The only provision in Canon 4 that meets an
exception is the misrepresent clause, and the Eleventh Circuit noted this in its analysis.157 The other restrictions must pass the strict scrutiny standard of a compelling
governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest.158
The lower court cases, along with the Supreme Court's decision in White I, help
determine whether the speech restrictions in the ABA's proposed draft meet the
standards of strict scrutiny. After White I, the announce clause is no longer a valid
restriction; 159 however, this does not directly impact the Code because it no longer
contains an announce clause. ° Nevertheless, the lower courts have used White I to
strike down other provisions that are in the Code. 161 Those provisions include the
pledges-or-promises, commit or appear-to-commit, misrepresent, solicitation, and
political-activities clauses. 62 An analysis of the relevant cases shows that the ABA
is ignoring the standards set forth in the White line of cases by proposing provisions
that do not meet strict scrutiny.
A. The "Partisan-Activities"Clause

The proposed draft makes a few additions to the partisan-activities clause. The
relevant portion of the draft reads as follows:
(A)... a judge or a judicial candidate shall not:
(1) act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a political organization;
(2) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(3) publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office;
(4) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution
to a political organization or a candidate for public office;
(5) attend or purchase tickets for dinners or other events sponsored
by a political organization or a candidate for public office;
(6) publicly identify himself or herself as a candidate of a political organization;
(7) seek, accept, or use endorsements from a political organization ....

163

156

Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

'5
158

Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (llth Cir. 2002).
White I, 536 U.S. at 774-75.

'9

Id. at 788.

'60
161

See MODELCODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 5 (1990) (omitting the announce clause).
See supra Parts III-IV.

162

Id.

163

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(1)-(7), in

REPORT,

supra note 20, at 151.

ABA
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The Code has some exceptions for judicial candidates, which differ depending on
whether the election is partisan or non-partisan.' 64 However, none of the exceptions
allow candidates to make speeches, hold office, or solicit funds for political organizations. 165
Between federal and state courts, the case law regarding this clause is inconsistent.
Using the White I analysis, the Eighth Circuit held that the clause did not satisfy strict
scrutiny.' 66 In addition, federal district courts also have held the clause to be unconstitutional.1 67 The district court in Spargo noted that the candidates had previously par168
ticipated in politics; otherwise, they would not be "in the position of a candidate."'
Because of this reality, the clause was not narrowly tailored. 169 The case, however, is
not binding because the Second Circuit vacated the decision for procedural reasons.'70
Because the decision was vacated, the New York Court of Appeals was not bound by
71
the decision and upheld the clause. '
Supporters of the clause produce numerous reasons for the prohibitions. The two
primary reasons are judicial independence and unbiased judges, which were the reasons given in White II and Raab. 72 With regard to judicial independence, a "special
relationship" forms between the candidate and the party. 73 When a judge is active
in a political party, the relationship can cause the judge to "conform [his] judicial decisions to the party line."'' 74 If the judge does conform his views, then the party is
leading the judiciary instead of the law, which diminishes judicial independence.
Similarly, states have an interest in maintaining an impartial or unbiased judiciary.
This interest is important because it "assures equal application of the law," which is
"essential to due process."'' 75 The bias appears in two forms: bias towards a party
176
in court and bias towards a position.
164

Id. Canon 4, Rule 4.2, in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 162-63.

165

Id.

166
167

White 11, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
See O'Neill v. Coughlan, No. 1:04-CV-1612, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760 (N.D. Ohio

Jan. 26, 2007) (enjoining enforcement of Canon 7(B)(3)(b) of the Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct, which prohibited candidates from identifying with a political party); Spargo v. N.Y.
State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
168 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
169 Id. at 89.
170 Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the district court should have allowed the case to proceed through the state disciplinary
process), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004).
171 See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003).
172 White I,416 F.3d 738,751 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006); Raab,
793 N.E.2d at 1290.
173Richard Briffault, JudicialCampaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 181, 232 (2004).
174

Id.

175

White 1, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002).
Catherine Ava Begaye, Are ThereAny Limits onJudicialCandidates'PoliticalSpeech

176
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Regarding bias towards a party, the litigants could be active members of the
political party or be the political party. If a judge, who publicly aligns himself with
that political party, hears the case, the public would likely question whether the judge
was impartial and unbiased. However, this situation would occur in just a "handful
177
of cases," so recusal is a sufficient option.
Bias against a litigant who holds a different political view is tied into bias towards
a particular position.178 By participating in political activities, ajudge could give the
"appearance of a bias against [a] political ideology" that was different from his party,
which then can be inferred into "a bias against those parties not in accord with the
judge's political point of view. ' 179 In addition, the public may believe that a political
party is influencing a judge's decision if that judge engages in political activities. "°
The appearance of impartiality would then be harmed. In the end, supporters argue
that "[s]uch political activity turns judges into politicians and gives the public the impression that judicial candidates will allow their political views to factor into how they
will decide cases once on the bench."' 81
One argument from the opponents of the partisan-activities clause is thatjudges
are associated with political parties before becoming candidates. The court in Spargo
made note of this concern:
[A] wholesale prohibition on participating in political activity for
fear of influencing a judge ignores the fact that a judicial candidate must have at one time participated in politics or would not
find him or herself in the position of a candidate.... There is no
support for the proposition that one-time participation in political
activity impedes the making of independent judgments any less
82
than current participation in some political activity might.
If voters follow judicial campaigns and research the candidates, they would most likely
find the candidate's party affiliation. Just because the public knows to which party
a candidate belongs does not mean the public will perceive the candidate as biased.
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White?, 33 N.M. L. REV. 449, 468 (2003).
177 Briffault, supra note 173, at 230.
178 Begaye, supra note 176, at 468.
179

Id.
Briffault, supra note 173, at 232.
181 Jessica Conser, Comment, Achievement of JudicialEffectiveness Through Limits on
180

JudicialIndependence: A ComparativeApproach, 31 N.C.J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 255,299
(2005).
182 Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88 (N.D.N.Y.
2003). The Eighth Circuit made the same argument when overturning the clause. White II,
416 F.3d 738, 758 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The few months a candidate is ostensibly purged of his

association with a political party can hardly be expected to suddenly open the mind of a candidate who has engaged in years of prior political activity."), cert.denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
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Some supporters of the clause believe the election period is different. The period
is "quite distinctive," and statements have a "special significance.' ' 8 3 However, this
position does not fit with the Supreme Court's opinion in White I. The Court noted
that election statements were only a small portion of public speech on legal issues and
thatjudges "have often committed themselves on legal issues."'" Because the Court
did not see a difference in pre-election statements and election statements, it probably
would not see a difference between involvement in political activities before an election
and during an election.
The other argument against the political-activities clause is that it is both underinclusive and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it does not include interest groups. These groups can demonstrate a candidate's view more easily than a
political party and can be just as large." 5 Religious beliefs can be more important
than political views and can even influence one's political views. Interest groups
are "more narrowly focused" and "convey[] a much stronger message of alignment
with particular political views and outcomes. ' 86 Yet, the Model Code does not prohibit participation in interest group activities. In addition, the clause is over-inclusive.
The canons "intrude . . .upon the lives of incumbent judges on almost a daily
basis."'8 7 The other clauses prohibit activity only during a specific time, but the
political-activities clause regulates judges until they leave the bench. The "interest
in judicial legitimacy" is not "sufficiently compelling to allow states to force their
judges to bear the cost of that intrusion."'8 8
Both sides have legitimate points, and reviewing courts have come to different
conclusions on the clause. One useful means to determine the constitutionality of
the proposed political-activities clause is to ask whether it targets issue or party bias.
The Court in White I drew "a distinction between issue-neutrality and party-neutrality
when applying its constitutional analysis to provisions of the Model Code."'189 Proponents claim that impartiality is a compelling state interest. When defining impartiality, the Court "focuses on the ability of the judge to remain neutral between parties,"''
and it has stated that "avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable."' 9' Because political involvement is "a good indicator of the
Briffault, supra note 173, at 233.
White I, 536 U.S. 765, 779 (2002).
185 White 11, 416 F.3d at 760.
183

184

186

Id.

Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-MajoritarianPowerandJudges' PoliticalSpeech,
58 FLA. L. REv. 53, 116 (2006) (citation omitted).
187

188
189

Id.
Joe Cutler, Qops! I Said It Again: Judicial Codes of Conduct, the FirstAmendment,

and the Definition of Impartiality, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 733, 734 (2004).

"9Id. at 740 (citing White I, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76 (2002) ("Impartiality in this sense
assures equal application of the law. That is, it guarantees a party that the judge who hears
his case will apply the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party.")).
'9' White I, 536 U.S. at 778.

STOP RESTRICTING SPEECH AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC

2007]

1073

[candidate's] values,"'9 2 the clause shields people from knowing a candidate's position
on "issues.' 93 In White II,Minnesota made this argument to the Eighth Circuit, saying
that party affiliation was "shorthand" for the candidate's views.'9 4 When reviewing
this argument, the court held that the clause was "'barely tailored"' to the interest of
95
impartiality towards a party.1
The political-activities clause in the proposed draft fails strict scrutiny. If impartiality means open-mindedness, then the clause is "woefully underinclusive," as it does
not prohibit party association before becoming a candidate and does not prohibit interest group affiliation.'96 Moreover, the clause is not limited to party bias. As admitted by its proponents, the clause is meant to prohibit a candidate from aligning himself
with the views of a political party. 97 The Supreme Court expressly held that candidates can communicate their views to the electorate.'98 Views are the same whether
expressed directly by the candidate or indirectly through party affiliation. For these
reasons, the clause fails strict scrutiny and violates the First Amendment.
B. Pledges-or-PromisesClause
The proposed draft does not significantly change the pledges-or-promises clause.
The provision states that "a judge or a judicial candidate shall not.., in connection
with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make
pledges [or] promises.., that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of the office."' ' The comments following the rule note that candidates are allowed to announce their views on legal issues, but they should make
clear the "obligation to apply and uphold the law, without regard to his or her personal views. ',200
Since the White I decision, two cases have reviewed the pledges-or-promises
clause but reached different conclusions. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the clause in In re Watson.2 °' In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held unconstitutional the
Kentucky pledges-or-promises clause. 2' Looking at the difference between the two
cases can help alleviate the problem of these two differing opinions. In Kentucky,
192

Begaye, supra note 176, at 470.

'93 Cutler, supra note 189, at 752.
194 White II, 416 F.3d 738, 754 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
'9' Id. (quoting White I, 536 U.S. at 776).
196 Id. at 758, 760.
197 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
198 White I, 536 U.S. 765.
'99 Proposed MODEL CODE
REPORT,

OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(13), in ABA

supra note 20, at 151.

200

Id. cmt. 13, in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 154.

201

794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003).

202

Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th

Cir. 2004).
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the courts had construed the pledges-or-promises clause so broadly that in essence
it was an announce clause.2 °3 The Sixth Circuit found that Kentucky was limiting
more than promises or pledges to rule a certain way. 2 '4 In contrast, the court in Watson
believed the statements to be a promiseto "aid law enforcement., 20 5 The difference
between the holdings suggests that the clause may be valid if it only restricts actual
pledges or promises.
The compelling state interest is the same as for the announce clause-impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. For the pledges-or-promises clause, however,
"the implications for impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are more pronounced."2 6 A candidate's promise to be tough on all drug dealers "would imply an
overt bias" against persons being tried for drug dealing. 20 7 This overt bias does not
give the appearance of impartiality. Analysis of issue- and party-neutrality is helpful in this circumstance. Announcing one's view shows the candidate's "general approach to particular legal questions. '2 °8 Making a promise is the candidate's pledge
to a particular party. Thus, the interest would be that of party neutrality, 0 9 which
would be compelling.
Another view of impartiality is that of open-mindedness. This meaning requires
judges to be "open to persuasion" regarding issues that come before the court. 2'0 Although the Supreme Court did not determine whether this interest was compelling,
one can make the argument that prohibiting a judge from promising a particular decision protects judicial impartiality."' A difference exists between having a prior view
before hearing a case and having made a promise to decide the case in a particular
way. "Due Process requires that the judge's mind must be 'open enough to allow rea21 2
sonable consideration of the legal and factual issues presented.'
Even if a compelling interest exists, White I requires the regulation to be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.213 The Court in White I held that the announce clause
was not narrowly tailored partly because the candidate could make announcements
before and after he ran for office. 214 Arguably, this analysis does not work as well for
the pledges-or-promises clause. The purpose of giving the promise, which would be
203

Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp 2d 672, 697 (E.D. Ky.

2004), stay denied sub nom. Ky. JudicialConduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224.
204 Ky. JudicialConduct Comm 'n, 388 F.3d at 227.
205 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 5.
206 Begaye, supra note 176, at 472.
207 Id.
208 Briffault, supra note 173, at 213.
209 Cutler, supra note 189, at 744.
210 White 1, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002).
211 Briffault, supra note 173, at 211.
212 Id. (quoting In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003)).
213 White 1, 536 U.S. 765.
214 Id. at 779.
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given during the campaign, is to be elected; thus, a restriction applying only to campaign promises seems reasonable.2" 5
Furthermore, pledges and promises are different from announcements in another
way. Candidates, if elected, "will have aparticularreluctance to contradict" campaign
promises." 6 The candidate "will positively be breaking his word" if he rules in a way
opposite from his campaign promise."' Opponents to the rule note that candidates
do not feel committed to campaign promises.2 8 Justice Scalia even commented that
campaign promises are not necessarily binding commitments. 1 9 This assertion may
be true; however, promises "can lead the litigants who appear before [the judge] to
believe that [he] will act in a way consistent with [his] campaign behavior rather than
consistent with due process and due course of law., 22' This belief, whether true or
not, would effect the appearance of impartiality. Moreover, voters may take the promise seriously and "take action" in the next election according to whether the candidate upheld his promise.221
While the clause restricts only promises and pledges, it would probably meet the
standards of strict scrutiny. The proposed draft allows candidates to announce their
views on legal issues, which is essential to upholding the clause.222 The actual difference between an announcement and a promise "may be thin," but a promise signals
that the candidate has prejudged a case. 223 This prejudgment is in direct conflict with
judicial impartiality and open-mindedness.224 Preventing such bias is a compelling
state interest, and the clause appears to be narrowly tailored to meet this interest. For
these reasons, the pledges-or-promises clause should be constitutional.
C. Commit Clause

The drafters of the Model Code have changed the format of the commit clause.
The 1990 Code prohibited speech that "appear[ed] to commit" the candidate. 225 Not

only does the proposed draft drop that language, it incorporates the commit clause
into the pledges-or-promises clause.226 The section states that candidates "shall not...

216

Begaye, supra note 176, at 473.
White I, 536 U.S. at 780.

217

Id.

215

Briffault, supra note 173, at 212.
White I, 536 U.S. at 780 ("[O]ne would be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are-by long democratic tradition-the least binding form of human commitment.").
220 Briffault, supra note 173, at 212 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
218

219

221

Id.

See Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224,
227 (6th Cir. 2004).
223 Briffault, supra note 173, at 213.
222

224

Id.

CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1 (A)( 13), in ABA
REPORT, supra note 20,at 157.
225 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
226
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in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises, or commitments. 22 7 The change may save the clause,
but its constitutionality is still questionable.228
The one case to implicate the commit clause is from the Sixth Circuit, which overturned the clause because the state was using it as an announce clause. 229 The comment in the draft allows the candidate to announce his views, which would indicate
that committing and announcing are different. 2 0 However, the ABA's amicus curiae
brief for the White I decision said that the Minnesota announce clause had "the same
scope as the corresponding provision in the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.' ' 23 ' Two points caution against rushing to the conclusion that the clause is therefore unconstitutional. First, in the White I opinion, "the Court made clear that it did
not know whether the announce clause, as construed, and the commit clause mean[t]
the same thing," and it noted that Minnesota had both an announce clause and a commit
clause.232 Second, the ABA amended the clause in 2003 by taking out the "appear[s]
to commit" language and merging the clause with the pledges-or-promises clause.233
Arguably, the clause no longer has the same scope as the previous announce clause.
Even with the revision, the clause's constitutionality is still doubtful. The White
I decision gave three definitions of impartiality, the last one being open-mindedness.3
The announce clause did not meet this definition, and one could argue that the commit clause's "purpose [was] to restrictjudicial candidates' speech that might improperly influence how the electorate votes," which would be "essentially the same" as the
announce clause.235 On the other hand, the clause could be limited in application.
Minnesota had limited its announce clause to "issues likely to come before a court";
however, the Court did not believe this to be a limitation because "'[t]here is almost
no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an American court,
state or federal, of general jurisdiction.' 236 Currently, the commit clause applies to
"cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court. 237
227

Id.

Briffault, supra note 173, at 216-17 (noting that the commit clause does not add much
to the pledges-or-promises clause, that the two clauses should be merged, and that the "appear
to commit" language is troubling).
229 Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th
Cir. 2004).
230 Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1, cmt. 13, in ABA
REPORT, supra note 20, at 154.
231 Brief for American Bar Association as Amici Curiae at 1, White 1, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
(No. 01-521).
232 Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to HarmfulSpeech? Judicial
Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REv. 262, 295 (2003).
233 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(1) (2004).
234 White 1, 536 U.S. at 775-78.
235 Begaye, supra note 176, at 466-67.
236 White 1, 536 U.S. at 772 (citation omitted).
237 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
228
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Opponents argue that the commit clause is similar to the announce clause. According to some, the commit clause is "aimed at restricting a candidate from voicing his
or her opinion about legal issues, rather than aiming the prohibition squarely against
parties.' 238 By using "commit" instead of "announce," the clause could be focused on
party neutrality. 23 9 However, the pledges-or-promises clause already covers party neutrality. By having both clauses, the Code "naturally embod[ies] an issue/party distinction; a person commits to issues but makes pledges to parties., 241 In addition, the
clause specifically prohibits making commitments to "issues that are likely to come
before the court., 241 Therefore, the clause cannot be limited to bias against a particular
party, and limiting the scope to issues likely to come before the court does not change
the designation from issue-to party-neutrality. The Supreme Court held that this limit
is "not much of a limitation at all" because judges can hear almost any legal or political issue.242 Precluding commitments to issues is not narrowly tailoring the clause.
Some proponents argue that the commit clause is closer to the pledges-or-promises
clause than the announce clause. Statements that would fall under the commit clause
"are likely to resemble pledges and promises in both content and effect., 243 The commit clause ensures that statements with the same effect as promises and pledges are
244
restricted even if the statement does not contain the words "promise" or "pledge."
If the commit clause was merely a catch-all clause, then the pledges-or-promises
clause's focus on party neutrality would also apply to the commit clause. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the clause is now incorporated into the pledgesor-promises clause.
Another argument against the clause is the interest in having an informed voter.
The White I Court recognized this interest and noted that it had "never allowed the
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters
during an election. 2 45 Elected officials play an important role in society, and they
should give their views on public concerns. 2" Many people argue that judges are
"fundamentally different" from other elected officials, and their elections should have
different standards. 47 Even if judges are different, the reality is that judges do make
Begaye, supra note 176, at 466.
Cutler, supra note 189, at 744.
Id. at 745.
24' Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(13), in ABA
REPORT, supra note 20, at 151.
242 White 1, 536 U.S. 765, 772 (2002).
243 Briffault, supra note 173, at 215.
244 Id. at 216.
241 White 1,
536 U.S. at 782.
246 Id. at 781-82.
247 Id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 746
("[A]lthough judges are different from other elected officials in many ways, in other more
crucial ways they are identical. Judges, like all elected officials, must make decisions and
238
239
240
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policy. 248 "[S]tate courts are deeply involved not just in interpreting but in making
'
the law"249
and "are seen as major policy players." ' 0 In Minnesota, for example, the
courts have found a right to public funding for abortion, have overturned sodomy and
conceal-and-carry laws, and have given orders to the legislature regarding the state
budget. 25' Although some people acknowledge that judges make policy, they believe
the decision comes only from the law and facts. Many courts, however, are coming
to the realization that "policy is influenced by the philosophies of the judges. 253 If
judges make policy based on their views, then the public needs to be aware of these
views so that it can make an educated decision when voting.
The future of the commit clause is uncertain. Because it applies to "issues," the
commit clause has the same problem as the announce clause and could be unconstitutional. If the clause was limited to cases and controversies, it would have a better
chance of surviving a constitutional challenge because it would be similar to a promise.2 The crucial point is whether the clause is more analogous to the announce clause
or the pledges-or-promises clause.255 If the courts view it as closer to an announce
clause, then it will be unconstitutional.256 The changes to the clause since White I appear to bring the clause more in line with the pledges-or-promises clause. However,
as long as the commit clause applies to issues, it will be unconstitutional because it
has the same narrowing problems as the announce clause.
frequently have discretion in choosing. Judges, like all elected officials, come to their role
with views that are likely to affect their decisions. Voters in judicial elections, like all elections,
should evaluate candidates based on their views, as well as their professional qualifications,
experience, and suitability for the role. All of these similarities justify treating the speech of
judicial candidates like that of all other politicians.").
248 Some even argue that the codes are protecting judicial policy. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia,
Restrictionson JudicialElection CampaignSpeech: Silencing CriticismofLiberalActivism,
in FREEDOM OF SPEECH 148, 156 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2004) ("Put forth in the name

of protecting judicial independence, impartiality, and the appearance of impartiality, the actual
purpose and effect of the codes is to protect judicial policymaking power, which almost always
means in practice the power to enact liberal social policies by rulings of unconstitutionality.").
249 Brendan J. Doherty, Stifled Speech and JudicialCampaigns: An Analysis ofa Conflicted
Legal Culture in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 32 N. KY. L. REv. 305,317 (2005).
250 David A. Schultz, JudicialSelection in Minnesota: Options After Republican Party v.
White, 62 BENCH &B. MINN. 17, 19 (2005), availableat http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/

2005/novO5/j udicial_selection.htm.
251

Id.

See Shirley S. Abrahamson, JudicialIndependence as a Campaign Platform: The
Importance of Fairand ImpartialCourts, 84 MICH. B.J. 40, 41 (2005) ("Judges base their
decisions on the facts and law presented in each individual case, not on their personal viewpoints on policy issues.").
22

254
255

Dimino, supra note 187, at 74.
Moerke, supra note 232, at 297-98.
Cutler, supra note 189, at 745.

256

Id.

253
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D. MisrepresentClause

In the proposed draft, the ABA has made slight changes to the misrepresent clause.
The draft adds "with reckless disregard" and takes out specific information that cannot
be misrepresented. 57 The clause states that "ajudge or ajudicial candidate shall not...
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make any false or misleading statement."258 Although the rule says "knowingly," the comment merely states that a candidate must "refrain from making statements that are false or misleading. 259 If a state
interprets this difference broadly to sanction more than knowing falsehoods, the clause
would be unconstitutional.26
The misrepresent clause is different from the pledges-or-promises and commit
clauses in that it "is aimed at false, rather than some type of promissory, speech."2 6'
The Court has given only minimal protection to false speech. Under First Amendment
jurisprudence, the state can proscribe speech that is false and made with "actual malice," which is "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false. 2 62 If the scope of the misrepresent clause is confined to this standard, then no
problem exists regarding its constitutionality.
On the other hand, if the scope is broader, then a challenge is possible. The
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited speech that was "false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contain[ed] a material misrepresentation of fact., 263 The
Eleventh Circuit declared this to be unconstitutional.2 64 The court held that the restriction "must be limited to false statements that are made with knowledge of falsity
or with reckless disregard.2 65 This is the same standard as the one stated in New York
Times.2 66 Although states that have a broad clause or broadly construe the clause will
have problems meeting the standard in White I, the narrower clause of the Model
Code is constitutional.

257 Compare Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 4, Rule 4. 1(A)(1 1),

in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 151, with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5,
Rule 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
258

Proposed

260
261
262
263

264
265
266

Canon 4, Rule 4. I(A)(1 1), in ABA

supra note 20, at 151.
Id. Canon 4, Rule 4.1, cmt. 7, in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 153.
See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 th Cir. 2002).
Moerke, supranote 232, at 311.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1315.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1319.
See generallyNew York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254.
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E. Solicitation Clause

The solicitation clause does not allow a candidate to "personally solicit or accept
campaign contributions."2 67 However, the proposed draft allows the candidate to es268
tablish a campaign committee that will solicit donations on the candidate's behalf.
In addition, the proposed draft establishes contribution limits and charges the committee to accept only "reasonable" contributions.269
This prohibition against personal solicitations conflicts with decisions from two
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled the prohibition to be unconstitutional.27 ° A difference in the questioned clauses does exist,
but it should not change the analysis. The Minnesota Code forbade the committee
from disclosing to the candidate the identity of donors or those who declined to donate. 27 ' The Georgia Code, on the other hand, did not preclude candidates from obtaining this information. The drafters of the proposed Model Code have adopted
the latter approach.273
Proponents of the solicitation clause believe the clause is essential to maintaining
judicial impartiality. According to a national survey, sixty-seven percent of voters
agree that "[i]ndividuals or groups who give money to judicial candidates often get
favorable treatment. '274 When voters perceive that ajudge is biased towards one party,
the appearance of judicial impartiality is damaged. However, the poll question does
not distinguish between personally-solicited and committee-solicited contributions.
The real question is not whether campaign contributions damage judicial impartiality but whether personal solicitation increases the danger. Proponents argue that
the solicitation clause focuses on party neutrality.275 Personal solicitation creates a
"relationship between the donor and the candidate" and can "turn donors into constituents," who are "potential litigants. 276 The relationship can involve personal
meetings with "the opportunity for each to look the other in the eye" or a phone call
with a "heighten[ed] . . . sense of direct contact. "277 With these personal contacts, the
Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(8), in ABA
REPORT, supra note 20, at 151.
268 Id. Canon 4, Rule 4.4(A)-(B), in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 173.
267

Id. Canon 4, Rule 4.4(B)(1), in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 173.
See White II, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006);
Weaver, 309 F.3d 1312.
271 White 11, 416 F.3d at 765.
272 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1315.
273 Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.4(A)-(B), in ABA
269
270

REPORT, supra note
274

20, at 173.

Justice at Stake Campaign, National Poll of American Voters (2001), Q.50, http://www

.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf [hereinafter JAS Survey].
275 Cutler, supra note 189, at 748.
276

id.

277

Briffault, supra note 173, at 227.
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candidate may have a "heightened sense of gratitude" and "sympathy for the donor's
interests. 278 The public may view the personal solicitation as increasing the risk of
bias towards a litigant who contributed to the candidate's campaign. 279 The added
appearance of bias can damage the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary.
Another point made by proponents is that the judicial branch is different from the
legislature and the executive. Although bias could arise in the other branches from
personal solicitations, "legislators and executives regularly meet with individuals...
in private, one-sided sessions in which those individuals... are free to advocate their
concerns and seek support. 280 Judges, on the other hand, do not regularly meet in
private with individuals who have matters before the court; in fact, judicial standards
preclude such meetings. 28' Allowing a judicial candidate to hold private meetings
to solicit funds threatens the appearance of impartiality.282 Furthermore, many of the
donations come from lawyers and their clients, who regularly have business before the
court; allowing judges to personally solicit these individuals "exacerbates" the threat
283
to impartiality.
The argument that personal solicitations heighten the danger to judicial impartiality may seem persuasive, but the Eleventh Circuit expressly discarded the argument.
According to the court, "the risk is not significantly reduced by allowing the candidate's
2
agent to seek these contributions ... rather than the candidate seeking them himself." 8
Candidates who are inclined to favor donors will be biased "regardless of who did the
'
If the candidate knows who donated, then the potential for
soliciting of support."285
bias is present. Moreover, keeping the names of donors from candidates does not save
the clause. Under this situation, the clause is not narrowly tailored because a judge
cannot be biased towards contributors if he does not know their identities.286
Having an election means candidates need to gather funds and endorsements from
people in the community. 287 Lawyers, as part of the community, contribute to judicial
campaigns. The concern that lawyers' contributions will harm the appearance ofjudicial impartiality is not too strong when looking at the proposed code. First, the drafters
expressly mention lawyers' ability to contribute funds.288 The comment mentions a
heightened level of care needed when handling contributions from lawyers because
278

Id.

279

Id.

280

Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 228.

28
282

Id.

283

Id.

284
2185
286

287
288

Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1323.
White II, 416 F.3d 738, 765 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
Proposed MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, Rule 4.4, cmt. 3, in ABA

REPORT,

supra note 20, at 174.
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they could "create grounds for disqualification., 28 9 However, if the threat to impartiality would lead to "disqualification," then the code expressly says that recusal is
sufficient to handle any problem the situation might present. 290 The stricter rule regarding personal solicitations, therefore, is not necessary under this concern.
The other reason why lawyers' contributions do not pose a significant risk has to
do with the proposed code's contribution limits. The proposed code does not give a
specific amount but says individuals and groups should not exceed an amount that will
be determined by the state. 29' Candidates would never receive more than the limited
amount from any one donor. "A campaign contribution base with more contributors
of smaller amounts undermines the appearance and reality of an improper influence
created by fewer contributors of larger amounts."292 A judge would feel less pressure
to act favorably toward a donor, if the donor gave an amount that many other individuals gave. The contribution limits, therefore, reduce the risk of biased judges and
help preserve the appearance of impartiality. With these limits, the restriction on personal solicitations is not narrowly tailored.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAT SATISFY WHITE AND THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Even if some of the clauses are unconstitutional, the ABA and states are not without alternatives. Since White I, many people have put forth suggestions, and some
states have revised their codes of judicial conduct. One possible solution is to have no
restrictions and allow partisan elections. As one article mentions, having partisan elections would give voters more information on the candidates, and this "might actually
encourage more interest in these races reversing the ballot drop-off phenomena characteristic of voting patterns presently in Minnesota and other states. 293 However, this
possibility seems unlikely with the ABA's dislike of partisan judicial elections, which
is evidenced by its proposed code and recent statements from the chair of the commission. 294 A better solution might be to educate the public regarding the importance
of judicial independence and impartiality. Such education might include: "What is
Id.
Id. Canon 2, Rule 2.11, in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 74-75.
291 Id. Canon 4, Rule 4.4(B)(2), in ABA REPORT, supra note 20, at 173.
289

290

Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financingfor Non-PartisanJudicial Campaigns:
ProtectingJudicialIndependence While Ensuring JudicialImpartiality,38 AKRON L. REV.
292

597, 612 (2005).
293 David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Futureof
State Judicial
Selection, 69 ALB. L. REv. 985, 1007 (2006).
294 Statement of Mark Harrison, Comm'n Chair, ABA Joint Comm'n to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Oct. 2006), availableathttp://www.abanet.org/judicialethics
("We have endeavored to adhere to and apply [independence, integrity, and impartiality]
throughout the Code, firm in the belief that they are indispensable to preservation of the
public trust in our judiciary and confidence in our legal system.").
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judicial independence? Why is judicial independence important to you, the citizen?
What are the threats to judicial independence? How can judicial independence be protected? ' 295 These points will help "citizens to evaluate critical attacks on judges and
to value judicial independence. 2 96
In addition to educating the public, states could ask candidates to voluntarily
submit to campaign restrictions. Of course, the candidates "most interested in more
partisan races would be unlikely to.. . adhere[] to new restrictions." 297 However, an
educated public would be able to determine which values-partisan interests orjudicial
independence-were more important to them. After learning and realizing the importance of judicial impartiality and independence, an individual might determine that
these are more important than the current political issues. He then could vote for the
candidate who was acting in accord with judicial independence. Even if an informed
individual votes in favor of particular issues, the appearance of impartiality is not
harmed. If the voter thought a campaign harmed the appearance of impartiality, he
could vote for the other candidate. By voting for a more partisan candidate, the voter
shows that impartiality is not damaged. With education and information, the voters
can make the best decision for themselves and their community.
In addition to education, some states have amended their codes. North Carolina
recently revised its code to allow candidates more freedom. Under the code, candidates are allowed to attend political gatherings, to endorse other judicial candidates,
and to identify themselves with a political party.29 8 In order to "strike a balance" between judicial impartiality and candidates' rights, the code contains some limitations

on political activities.' Candidates are not allowed to endorse non-judicial candidates,
solicit money for such candidates, or financially contribute to other candidates. 300
Even with these restrictions, some people believe the measures are "so permissive
that the public confidence in the judiciary can only decline."' ' However, this concern
is not in alignment with a national survey conducted in 2001 by the Justice at Stake
Campaign. In the survey, when asked how well the word "political" defined judges,
seventy-six percent answered "well., 30 2 The same percentage felt that "fair" also described judges well.3 3 These statistics show that the public can view judges both as
fair or impartial and as political. The determination whether a judge is fair would affect the public's confidence in the judiciary. Unfair judges would make confidence
decline. However, according to the statistics, political judges can also be fair judges,
295
296

297
298

Abrahamson, supra note 252, at 41.
Id.
Schultz, supra note 250, at 20.
N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 7(B)(l)-(3) (2006), availableat http://www

.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/Amendments-NCJudicialCode.pdf.
299 Id. Canon 7 pmbl.
300 Id. Canon 7(B)(l)-(3).
301 Conser, supra note 181, at 297.
302 JAS Survey, supra note 274, Q.33.
303

Id. Q.28.
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so increasing the amount of political activity in which ajudge can participate would
not necessarily make public confidence in the judiciary decline.
Regarding the pledges-or-promises and commit clauses, the states have formulated
different approaches. At one extreme, North Carolina has eliminated both clauses. 3°
Alabama prohibits candidates from making "any promise of conduct" or announce3 5 The provision eliminates the
ment of "conclusions of law on pending litigation.""
"issues" prohibition and focuses squarely on the problem: bias against a particular
party. Minnesota, after the White decisions, no longer has a commit clause, opting instead for only the pledges-or-promises clause. °6 North Carolina's approach does not
address the concern of judicial impartiality via party bias stemming from campaign
promises. The last two approaches address the concern of judicial impartiality, but
by limiting the clause only to promises and excluding issues, these clauses are more
narrowly tailored than the ABA's proposed draft.
The solicitation clause is more difficult. Alabama, Georgia, Nevada, and North
Carolina allow candidates to personally solicit contributions, but they also highly encourage candidates to establish committees to handle the soliciting.30 7 Although the
committees are no longer mandatory, an effective voter education program would give
them a strong incentive to use the committees. The candidates would want to avoid
any perceived bias of which the voters now were aware. Moreover, unlike political
activities and announcements, personal solicitations do not inform voters of a candidate's position on issues. The choice for voters would not be between two competing
values, impartiality or a particular issue. Instead, impartiality would be the only issue
with personal solicitations, and a candidate would be risking votes by not forming
a committee if the public was aware of the importance of impartiality.
CONCLUSION

The tension between candidates' First Amendment rights and society's interest
in an impartial and independent judiciary is hard to alleviate. As Justice O'Connor
304 N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 7 (2006), availableat http://www.aoc.state

.nc.us/www/public/aoc/Amendments-NCJudicialCode.pdf.
305 Ala. Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001), available at http://www
.alalinc.net/jic/docs/cans2000.pdf; see also

OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon

7(B)(2)(d) (1997), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rules/conduct (applying the
commit clause only to "cases or controversies").
306 MINN.CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2006), available at http://
www.bjs.state.mn.us/canon2.html.
'07 See ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(4) (2001), available at http://
www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/cans2000.pdf; GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) &
cmt. (1998), availableat http://www.gabar.org/handbook/georgiacode-ofjudicialconduct;
NEV. CODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2007), availableat http://judicial.state.nv
.us/nevcodejudicialconduct3new.htm; N.C. CODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 7(B)(4) (2006),
availableat http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/amendments-NCJudicialCode.pdf.
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noted, states have caused the problem by deciding to elect theirjudges. °8 However,
states are not likely to switch to an appointment system. In an ABA survey, "[s]eventyfive percent of [Americans] polled .. said that their confidence is greater in judges
they elect than in judges who are appointed. ' 30 9 Following these statistics, the public
would be reluctant to change the method of selecting judges. Because judicial elections
are still popular, states will need to find a way to balance the competing interests while
maintaining the elections.
In some of the proposed provisions, the ABA has failed to find the correct balance
between the respective interests. The misrepresent clause is constitutional, as long as
it keeps the "knowing" requirement. Combining the pledges-or-promises and commit
clauses may save them from being unconstitutional; however, the inclusion of "issues"
raises serious concerns for the commit clause. If the state construed issues to be more
than party bias, the clause would not be narrowly tailored or meet a compelling interest
and would therefore violate the First Amendment. In addition, the political activities
and solicitation clauses likely would not fair well. All federal courts to decide on the
clauses have declared both unconstitutional because they are not narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling state interest.
In revising its draft, the ABA should look to states that have recently changed their
codes. Allowing political activities and personal solicitation may not be desirable, but
disallowing such activity does not meet the First Amendment strict scrutiny standard.
The best solution is to educate the public regarding the importance of judicial impartiality and independence. If the public becomes concerned with having an impartial
judiciary, it is more likely to vote for candidates who will uphold this value. The ABA
needs to stress the importance of judicial impartiality and then let the public resolve
the tension between that and the desire to express political views during elections.
POST SCRIPT
On February 12, 2007, the ABA House of Delegates approved the ABA Report.1 0
The House of Delegates made no changes to the ABA Report.311 The proposed draft for
the campaign activity clause is now Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4 (2007).312

White 1, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" See Roger J. Miner, JudicialEthics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends,
32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1107, 1110 (2004).
3'0 ABA Model Code ofJudicialConduct,February2007, ABA Joint Comm'n to Evaluate
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, http://www.abanet-org/judicialethics/approved-MCJC.html.
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